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Abstract:  
 
This paper analyses the evolution of economists’ productivity 
after an important award such as the John Bates Clark Medal or the 
“Nobel Prize”. A diff-in-diffs methodology is used, with a control 
group  composed  of  economists  with  characteristics  close  to  the 
members of the treatment group, who were awarded prizes. Several 
robustness checks are used with different indicators of productivity 
(articles, weighted or not by reviews’ rankings and working papers) 
and  with  or  without  economists  and  time  fixed  effects  in  panel 
estimates. We  find that John Bates Clark  Medals alter  the (yearly 
cumulated)  ranking  of  articles,  while  the  number  of  publications 
remains unchanged, but only because of an increase in publications 
in non-ranked reviews. As regards Nobel Prizes, they neither alter 
the number of articles nor their quality. 
 
Keywords:  award,  diff-in-diffs  methodology,  John  Bates  Clark, 
Nobel Prize, productivity 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Do prizes in economics, such as the John Bates Clark or the 
Nobel Prize, affect productivity? 
 
All outcomes are possible, depending on the factors at play:  
  An increase in productivity, due to a rise in motivation or in the 
financing of projects. 
  A decrease in productivity, due to the fact that those who were 
awarded the prize think they have reached their goal and prefer to 
allocate their time in a different way, for instance, by delivering 
more  speeches,  investigating  other  areas  or  taking  on 
responsibilities other than research. This decrease in productivity 
may be incidental, in that the economists had already reached the 
peak  of their  productivity and it  would  have  declined anyway. 
However, assessing this effect is difficult and would suppose that 
the people awarding the prizes know when the peak of a career 
has  been  reached.  This  is  a  strong  assumption  given  the 
information  asymmetry  between  the  prize-givers  and  the 
contenders. 
  No change in productivity: even if the awarding of the prize leads 
to  gains  in  terms  of  reputation  and  financing  (amount  of  the 
prizes,  or  increased  financing  of  projects),  economists  do  not 
change their behavior. Concerning the rise in financing, this may 
be perceived as a temporary  shock as  opposed  to a  permanent 
change, by analogy with the permanent income hypothesis. 
 
The impact of these prizes cannot be assessed directly using 
dummies alone because many factors (age, year, etc.) can have an 
influence. Even if we try to control for factors such as age, year or LIEPP Working Paper n°24 
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each individual’s profile by adding an economist fixed effect, other 
factors may come into play. We thus need to consider a control group 
and a diff-in-diff methodology. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: after discussing the need 
for a control group and control variables from a methodological point 
a view, we compare the paper with the existing literature. We then 
set  the  results  from  the  various  econometric  estimates.  The  last 
section concludes. 
 
2.  Methodology  :  need  for  a  control  group  and 
control variables such as age 
 
2.1.Construction of the control group 
 
To construct the control group, we need economists who have 
characteristics that are comparable with those of the treatment group. 
For that purpose, we include economists  who were awarded prizes 
other  than  those  being  tested.  Since  we  are  testing  the  impact  of 
different prizes (the Nobel  Prize, the John Bates Clark Medal, the 
Frisch Medal and the IZA reward), and since these prizes have not 
been  awarded  to  the  same  economists  (not  all  John  Bates  Clark 
Medals were awarded the Nobel Prize and conversely), economists 
who have been awarded prizes different from the one considered in 
the regression can be used for the control group.  
 
Moreover,  we  include  economists  who  are  among  the  best 
358 ranked in the RePEc classification (we select only some of these 
economists, using the additional condition of age). We check that a 
sizable share of these economists is also considered favorites for the 2014/04 
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prizes under consideration, such as the Nobel Prize, by entities that 
make  forecasts  on  this topic (such as Thomson Reuters).  A lot  of 
these economists are also fellows of the Econometric Society, and 
the  proportion  is  roughly  comparable  to  the  one  of  the  treatment 
group. For example, 78% of the economists of the sample who have 
been  awarded  neither  the  Nobel  Prize  nor  the  John  Bates  Clark 
Medal are members of the Econometric Society, to be compared with 
88% of the economists of the sample who have received at least one 
of these two rewards. 
 
2.2.Need to control for the age of the economists 
 
Whether they were awarded a given prize (treatment group) 
or not (control group), the age of an economist seems to impact their 
productivity.  This  is  why  we  control  for  economists’  ages  in 
regressions. 
 
This stylized fact is illustrated by the following graphs. LIEPP Working Paper n°24 
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Graph 1: Distribution of economists in the potential sample (treatment and control group, 
without no age condition at this stage) by age 
 
Source: RePEc, author’s calculations  
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We can see in this first graph that the there is a peak in the 
age distribution at around 55 years. Although this may be due to a 
period effect (in the sense that the number of economists trained and 
likely  to  be  in  the  sample  may  depend  on  the  period  of  birth), 
justifying  the  inclusion  of  a  year  effect,  there  also  seems  to  be  a 
variation in productivity depending on age, which suggests that we 
need to include a fixed age effect in our regressions. 
 
We use another indicator to confirm the influence of age on 
the productivity  of the economists  in the  sample:  we  calculate the 
ratio between the actualized score (provided by RePEc) and the non 
actualized score of each economist. 
We then draw a graph connecting this ratio with the age of 
the economists (Cf. Graph 2). LIEPP Working Paper n°24 
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Graph 2: Ratio of the actualized score/non actualized score (average=1) 
 
Source: RePEc, author’s calculations  
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This  ratio  decreases  up  to  the  age  of  around  65,  and  then 
stabilizes  below  the  average  (around  0.9).  The  average  ratio  is 
reached at around 55 years of age. 
 
The impact of age is confirmed by Hamermesh (2013). This 
article also confirms that productivity depending on age evolves over 
time. These findings justify including both age and year variables in 
the regressions. 
 
 
3.  Comparison with the existing literature 
 
This  hypothesis  has  already  been  tested  in  the  realm  of 
mathematics:  Cf.  Borjas  &  Doran  (2013).  However,  the  present 
article differs from this in a number of ways: 
  Unlike  mathematics, a “Nobel  Prize” (or equivalent)  has been 
attributed in economics since 1969. We are thus able to analyze 
the impact of this prize and that of other prizes such as the John 
Bates Clark, the Frisch Medal and the IZA award. 
  Among the variables of productivity, we consider not only the 
number of publications, but also their quality.  As a robustness 
check,  we use an indicator  which is the sum  of the  following 
annual publication rankings for each economist
2:  
                                                           
2 As this indicator is the sum of the rankings for all publications in a given year for 
a  given  economist,  a  rise  in  the  indicator  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the 
average quality has increased. Even if the average quality diminishes, it may be 
compensated by an increased number of (ranked) publications. LIEPP Working Paper n°24 
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–  Fed New York ranking (attributing marks: 400, 200, 
etc.  down  to  25.  We  attribute  the  mark  nil  when  a 
publication is not included in this ranking). 
–  RePEc ranking. 
–  JCR influence and JCR ranking. 
 
  By taking into account the quality of publications, we are able to 
enlarge our control group to include not only economists who 
were  awarded  other  prizes  (Frisch  Medal,  IZA),  but  also 
economists who are highly ranked in the RePEc classification. 
We add another condition related to age (the economist must be 
at least 60 at the end of the period, since age has an impact on 
productivity, even if we control for it). 
  Since  economics  is  divided  into  more  different  areas  than 
mathematics, we are able to study the impact of awarding the 
Nobel Prize to a given economist (and thus to a given area, since 
economists are increasingly  specialized)  over other  contenders 
specializing in the  same area in  the  control  group (does their 
productivity  decrease  due  to  the  disappointment  of  not  being 
awarded the prize?). We consider contenders of a certain age (at 
least 55 in the year of the “disappointment”): their probability of 
receiving the Nobel Prize later on in the same area of economics 
should indeed be decreased. This would be a “by-product” of the 
Nobel Prize: even if it does not have a direct impact  on those 
who  are  rewarded,  it  may  affect  the  productivity  of  those 
“missing” this prize. 
 
Chan et al. (2013) also test the impact of the John Bates Clark 
Medal for economists using a diff-in-diffs methodology. They build 
a  synthetic  control  group  of  non  recipient  scholars  with  similar 2014/04 
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previous research performance. Yet, their analysis does not control 
for certain variables or effects such as individual fixed effects. As we 
will  see,  this  point  is  important,  all  the  more  so  as  samples  are 
limited and individuals specific. 
 
4.  Econometric results 
 
In the regressions, the general linear models (GLM) method 
is used, with the inclusion of some controls, such as age or certain 
fixed effects, depending on the case. 
 
For years in which no publications are registered, we take the 
value nil. 
 
When the explanatory variables are rankings, we sum up all 
the rankings for a given year. 
 
To take into account the time needed to publish an article, we 
consider the post-prize period as beginning three years after the prize 
was granted. 
This period of three years is necessary not just because of the 
time  needed  for  the  publication  process,  but  also  because  in  the 
period  immediately  after  the  award  of  the  Nobel  Prize,  the  prize-
winner’s rankings are boosted thanks to the publication of the Nobel 
award speech, which often appears in reviews such as the American 
Economic Review or the Scandinavian Journal of Economics. This 
boost in the cumulated rankings can be checked in the table in the 
appendix,  even  if  this  table,  calculated  directly  for  the  pool  of 
publications by all Nobel Prize winners, does not take into account 
either the year or the economist fixed effects and does not exhibit LIEPP Working Paper n°24 
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standard  errors. In  spite  of the boost  in the total score  due to the 
immediate  effect of the Nobel  Prize (i.e. up to 3  years after), the 
average scores seem to follow a regular decreasing path, justifying 
once more the inclusion of years and ages. 
 
The reference regression is as follows, using yearly data: 
 
Productivityi,t = a + b.dummy post John Bates Clark + c.dummy post 
Nobel  +  d.dummy  post  IZA  or  Frisch  Medal  +  e.period  post 
“disappointment” + f(age) + fixed effectsi + fixed effectst 
 
Where productivity i,t is the number of publications/working papers 
or the quality of the publications of the economist i, in year t. f(age) 
is a fourth degree polynomial function depending on age. 
The  “post  disappointment”  period  corresponds  to  the  years 
following  that  in  which  the  Nobel  Prize  was  attributed  to  an 
economist working on the same topics as the other economists in the 
control group who were at least 55 years at that time. 
 
Formally,  we  should  also  include  a  variable  for  the  period 
post  prize  attribution  for  the  control  group.  However,  with  the 
exception  of  the  John  Bates  Clark  Medal,  which  is  attributed  to 
economists up to the age of 40, the prizes under consideration have 
no age limit. Moreover,  the  function  of the age of  the  economists 
partly  fulfills  this  requirement.  The  inclusion  of  the  “post 
disappointment”  period  also  meets  this  requirement,  and  has  the 
advantage  of  also  taking  into  account  the  economists’  area  of 
specialization. 
As  a  robustness  check,  we  test  regressions  with  a 
supplementary variable covering the period after the age of 40, and 2014/04 
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the results are almost unchanged (Cf. also Tables 4 to 6, where the 
effects of the John Bates Clark Medal are tested separately with the 
inclusion of a variable to control for the fact of being over 40). 
 
4.1.Regressions with the number of publications and 
rankings 
 
 
We first set regressions without fixed effects (Cf. table 1).  
 
The results are as follows: 
  The impact of the John Bates Clark Medal is significant at the 
1% level in all cases and it seems to have a positive influence on 
productivity (number of publications and quality). The results are 
similar  for  the  variable  “Frisch  Medal  or  IZA”,  which  has  a 
positive influence on the quality of the publications, but not on 
their number.  
  The Nobel Prize variable is never significant. 
  The  “post  disappointment”  period  boosts  the  number  of 
publications, but not their quality. 
 
However,  as  shown  in  the  next  table,  which  displays  the 
reference regressions with economist and year fixed effects, some of 
these results are affected and are not robust to the inclusion of these 
fixed effects. LIEPP Working Paper n°24 
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Table 1: Regressions without fixed effects 
 2014/04 
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The inclusion of economist and year fixed effects gives the following 
results (Cf. table 2): 
 
  The John Bates Clark Medal no longer has an influence on the 
number  of  publications.  The  influence  on  quality  remains 
significant at the 1% or 5% level for all ranking indicators, but 
the  effect  becomes  negative.  This  finding  would  be  consistent 
with  that  of  Borjas  and  Doran  (2013)  for  the  Fields  Medal, 
particularly as the age threshold (40) is the same for both prizes. 
The  inclusion  of  these  fixed  effects  would  also  explain  the 
difference of conclusions with Chan et al. (2013), in which a diff-
in-diffs methodology is also used to estimate the impact of the 
John Bates Clark Medal, with a robust control group. Indeed, due 
to the small size of samples for treatment groups, not controlling 
for  economists  fixed  effects may  change  drastically results (all 
the  more  so  as  economist  who  win  prizes  cannot  really  be 
considered as homogeneous, because they have strong individual 
characteristics, including the choice of their specializations). 
  The influence of the Frisch or Iza prizes on the quality of articles 
remains significant for just two indicators, and then only at the 
10% level. 
  The Nobel  Prize  continues to  have no significant effect  on all 
indicators 
  The finding whereby the “post disappointment” period boosts the 
number of publications is still valid and still significant at the 1% 
level, although the magnitude of the effect is lessened. 
 LIEPP Working Paper n°24 
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Table 2: Regressions with economist and year fixed effects 
 2014/04 
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Table 3: Regressions with economist fixed effects and without year fixed effects 
 LIEPP Working Paper n°24 
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In  Table  3  we  also  perform  the  same  regressions  using 
economist fixed effects, but without year fixed effects. The results 
are on the whole consistent with the main findings of our previous 
regressions (negative influence of the John Bates Clark Medal on the 
quality  of  publications  and  positive  effect  on  the  number  of 
publications “post-disappointment” but coefficients are globally less 
significant). 
 
Since the main results concern the John Bates Clark Medal, 
we also  perform the  regressions by including  only the John Bates 
Clark,  to  avoid  any  colinearity  effects.  Since  this  prize  concerns 
economists under the age of 40, we also control for the fact of being 
over 40. Our findings on the effect of the John Bates Clark Medal 
(Cf. Tables 4 to 6, where Table 5, like Table 2, is the benchmark 
result with the most fixed effects) are very similar to those in Tables 
1 to 3. 2014/04 
18 
   
Table 4: Regressions with the John Bates Clark Medal alone, without fixed effects LIEPP Working Paper n°24 
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Table 5: Regressions with the John Bates Clark Medal alone, with economist and year fixed effects 
 2014/04 
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Table 6: Regressions with the John Bates Clark Medal alone, with economist fixed effects and without 
year fixed effects 
 LIEPP Working Paper n°24 
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4.2.Regressions with “other articles” (i.e. not classified by 
the Federal Reserve ranking) 
 
Table 7: Regression with the number of publications not listed by the 
Federal  Reserve,  with  and  without  economist  and/or  year  fixed 
effects 2014/04 
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We then analyze the  influence  of  prizes  on  publications in 
reviews  not  classified  by  the  Federal  Reserve,  which  means 
publications in reviews in non-standard areas, possibly intended to 
diversify the economist’s specialization, or in reviews with a limited 
reputation.  In  this  latter  case,  this  phenomenon  may  be  the 
consequence  of  either  1/  a  change  in  the  objective  quality  of  the 
economist’s  publications,  or  the  fact  that  he/she  is  paying  less 
attention to the ranking of the review, or 2/ an increase in the overall 
number  of  articles  published  by  the  economist,  and  thus  the 
publication of a certain number in reviews that are not as good as 
expected, as a kind of “collateral” effect of this boost in the number 
of publications. 
 
For economists awarded the John Bates Clark Medal, the first 
effect seems to hold true if we combine the results of Table 7 with 
those in Table 2. Economists receiving the John Bates Clark Medal 
do not reduce their total number of publications, but they maintain 
this  level  by  reducing  the  number  of  publications  in  well-ranked 
reviews,  which  has  an  impact  on  the  annual  quality  of  their 
publications  post-prize.  This  finding  on  diminished  quality  is 
particularly  robust  given  that  the  prestige  of  this  award  and  the 
possibilities offered by the related financing should, on the contrary, 
boost the rate of acceptance of submissions in well-ranked reviews, 
and diminish the magnitude of this altered quality. 
 
For economists who are in the “post-disappointment” period, 
the second hypothesis is the most likely, since Table 2 shows that the 
number of publications increases, but with no increase in the yearly 
cumulated quality.  LIEPP Working Paper n°24 
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For economists awarded the Nobel Prize  or  the  Frisch/IZA 
prizes, there seems to be no influence on the number of publications 
in other reviews. 
 
4.3.Regressions with working papers 
 
Table 8: Regressions with the number of working papers, with and 
without economist and/or year fixed effects  
 2014/04 
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As  a  complement,  we  analyze  the  impact  of  prizes  on  the 
number  of  published  working  papers  (Cf.  table  8),  which  allow 
economists to display their findings via a process which is generally 
“lighter” than the one for reviews. 
 
If  we  focus  on  regressions  using  both  economist  and  year 
fixed  effects,  we  find  that  the  John  Bates  Clark  has  no  influence 
whereas  the  Frisch  or  IZA  awards  boost  the  number  of  working 
papers.  Interestingly,  the  Nobel  Prize  seems  to  have  a  significant 
negative impact on the number of working papers, but no obvious 
impact on the number of articles or on their quality. 
Either Nobel Prize winners choose to spend less time on this 
process, independently of the review process, or, most likely, they 
choose to save time by submitting their articles directly to reviews, 
without  going  through  the  “first  step”  of  publishing  in  working 
papers. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Combining our results, we find that: 
  John Bates Clark Medals alter the (yearly cumulated) ranking of 
articles,  while the  number  of  publications remains unchanged, 
but only  because of an  increase in publications in  non-ranked 
reviews. 
  Nobel  Prizes  neither  alter  the  number  of  articles  nor  their 
quality,  which  does  not  mean  that  there  is  no  “composition” 
effect,  as  the  proportion  of  articles  in  reviews  such  as  the 
Journal  of  Economic  Literature  increases  noticeably.  They 
diminish the number of working papers: Nobel winners seem to LIEPP Working Paper n°24 
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adjust  their  time  allocation,  as  they  are  still  interested  in 
publishing  in  well-ranked  reviews,  but  spend  less  time  than 
before on the working papers process. They thus allocate their 
time in a different way, probably giving more interviews, taking 
on more responsibilities… or simply taking more time off. 
  Results are more mixed for awards such as the Frisch Medal or 
the IZA award. 
  Prizes do not just have direct effects, they also seem to have an 
influence on the contenders, as shown by the results of the “post-
disappointment”  period:  the  (yearly  cumulated)  ranking  of 
articles is unchanged, but the number of publications increases, 
thanks  to  non-ranked  reviews.  This  may  be  due  to  (aborted) 
attempts  to  publish  more  in  ranked  reviews  or  a  desire  to 
diversify  their  output,  including  in  topics  not  covered  by 
“traditional” ranked reviews.  
 
A  further  step  would  be  to  consider  the  interaction  of  the 
different prizes: is there a “learning effect” for economists awarded 
several prizes, i.e. a reaction different from those awarded just one 
prize? Does the way the post-reward period is managed (typically the 
post John Bates Clark period) in terms of number of publications or 
their quality, increase the probability of receiving the Nobel Prize, or 
is this awarded for one-off contributions? 
 
   2014/04 
26 
   LIEPP Working Paper n°24 
27 
         
References 
 
Borjas G. & Doran K. (2013), Prizes and Productivity: How Winning 
the Fields Medal Affects Scientific Output?, NBER Working Paper, 
No. 19445 
 
Chan H., Frey B., Gallus J. & Torgler B. (2013), Does the John Bates 
Clark Medal Boost Subsequent Productivity And Citation Success?, 
University of Zurich Working Paper n° 111, February. 
 
Hamermesh D. (2013), Ageing and productivity: Economists and 
others, VOX, 20
th February  2014/04 
28 
   
Appendix: scores (sum of rankings and average scores) by Nobel Prize winners before, during and after 
the Nobel Prize period 
 
 
 
Source: RePEc, author’s calculations 
Scores by Nobel prize winners
Up to 3 years before the 
Nobel prize
Up to 3 years after the 
Nobel prize
between 4 and 6 years 
after the Nobel prize
Sum of RePEc rankings 175,98 243,69 127,82
Average of RePEc rankings 1,05 0,94 0,87
Sum of JCR influence 375,57 579,15 317,21
Average of JCR influence 2,25 2,24 2,16
Sum of JCR impact 667,76 970,77 501,73
Average of JCR impact 4,00 3,76 3,41
Sum of ECB rankings 105,33 158,17 79,67
Average of ECB rankings 0,63 0,61 0,53 
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